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Traditional labour economics predicts that the supply of labour will increase as earnings 
increase. However, labour supply need not be positive, especially if workers make decisions 
based on short-term income targets. Income targeting may best describe jobs where workers 
decide on working hours and where wages are uncorrelated across days. This paper 
examines the labour supply of sex workers in Cape Town, whose working conditions largely 
fulfill these criteria. Contrary to traditional economic theory, we find evidence of a negative 
labour supply curve. 





Global and local estimates of the size of the sex work industry are scarce (Vanwesenbeeck, 
2001).  Yet, available evidence suggests that in many nations around the world, non-
negligible proportions of the female (and to a lesser extent male) population engage in sex 
work (see Table 1), and there is wide consensus that the industry is growing (Vandepitte et al, 
2006; Levitt and Dubner, 2009). Yet, very little is known about the nature of the industry, 
particularly the demand for sex. More information is available on the supply side, since it’s 
easier to identify sex workers as opposed to their clients, but even here, information is scarce. 
Consider that a much smaller fraction of the world female population hold political positions, 
yet much more is known about women in politics than women in sex work (UN Department 
of Public Information, 2005). The predominance of sociological and psychological literature 
on sex work also highlights the fact that very few researchers have seriously considered the 
economics of sex work. As Vanwesenbeeck (2001) points out, “the literature is still much 
more about sex than it is about work.”  This paper makes a contribution in rectifying this, by 
examining the labour supply of sex workers in Cape Town.  
 
In this analysis, which relies on data collected by the Sex Worker Education and Advocacy 
Taskforce (SWEAT),  sex work is treated as a standard service sector industry, and sex 
workers are viewed as economic agents who actively and voluntarily engage in sex work. 
While this latter point may be contested, qualitative data collected by SWEAT researchers 
suggests  that this is the correct way to view sex workers in Cape Town.  Contrary to 
traditional economic theory which posits an upward sloping labour supply curve, we find 
evidence of a negative labour  supply curve. This is consistent with notions of income 
targeting, and accords with results from Camerer et al (2007) who study the labour supply of 
New York city cab drivers. 
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Source: Vanderpitte et al, 2006 
Note: Figures for West and East Africa come from the capital city. 
 
The Supply of Sex Work 
This paper considers sex workers as economic agents who explicitly exchange sexual 
services for money. It does not deal with other cases that might be part of a broader definition 
  Overall Prevalence  Year 
WEST AFRICA1     
Benin  1.2%  2001 
Burkina Faso  4.3%  2000–03 
Cameroon  2.2%  1997 
Ivory Coast  0.7%  2000–04 
Ghana  1.1%  2003 
Niger  2.6%  2004 
EAST AFRICA     
Ethiopia  2.1%  2002 
Kenya  4.3%  1997–99 
ASIA     
Cambodia  0.4%  2003 
Indonesia  0.4%  2002 
Malaysia  0.9%  1999 
Nepal  2.0%  2000 
Philippines  2.6%  2000 
Vietnam  0.2%  2000 
EAST EUROPE     
Bulgaria  0.6%  2004 
Romania  0.8%  2004 
Croatia  0.5%  2004 
Bosnia/Herzegovina  0.5%  2004 
Serbia/Montenegro  0.6%  2004 
Czech republic  0.4%  2004 
Poland  0.6%  2004 
Slovenia  1.4%  2004 
WEST EUROPE     
Belgium  0.4%  2000 
Netherlands  0.6%  2000 
Luxembourg  0.4%  2000 
United Kingdom  0.5%  2000 
Austria  1.0%  2000 
Germany  1.4%  2000 
Finland  0.3%  2000 
Norway  0.3%  2000 
Italy  0.4%  2000 
LATIN AMERICA     
Dom Republic  1.8%  2001 
Belize  7.4%  2001 
Haiti  2.0%  2001 
Colombia  0.7%  2001 
Venezuela  1.5%  2001 4 
 
of sex work, for example, transactional sex between partners in a relationship, where sex is 
associated with an implicit agreement of payment (Selikow and Gibbon, 2010), or situations 
of human trafficking. There are two broad categories of sex workers: outdoor/street workers, 
and indoor/agency workers, and typically, most pay some economic rent to a middle-man (a 
manager, agent or “pimp) in return for some degree of protection, or in the case of indoor 
workers, for access to premises and clients (Gould, 2008).  
 
Traditional labour theory uses inter-temporal choice modeling to predict how workers make 
optimal decisions about the supply of their labour, and predicts that the supply of labour will 
increase  as earnings increase. Because workers choose between leisure time and time 
working, an increased wage equates to an increase in the opportunity cost of leisure, resulting 
in a reduction in leisure time, and an associated increase in work time (Lucas and Rapping, 
1969). By accurately discounting future utility, workers are expected to work longer hours 
when wage rates per hour are high and work fewer hours when wage rates per hour are low 
(Salvatore, 2003). An adaptation of these models argues that a positive relationship between 
time working and wages exists but only up to a point, after which workers no longer care 
about how much money they have, and thus respond negatively to further increases in wages. 
This theory is best depicted by a backwards-bending labour supply curve (Salvatore, 2003). 
 
Thus, if one views sex work as a service requiring labour power, the higher the wage rate that 
can be commanded for providing sex, the more likely individuals are to supply that service, 
and vice versa. Only in the event that wages exceed some threshold level would one expect to 
see a decline in hours worked. 
1
 
However, work by Camerer et al (1997) has presented a 
challenge to this traditional model of labour supply, arguing that labour supply need not be 
positive, especially if workers make decisions based on short-term target incomes. If workers 
consciously choose a target income for each day and work for as long as they need to until 
that target is reached, this produces an expected negative relationship between wage rates and 
time spent working. As wages per hour rise, workers have to spend less time on the job to 
reach their short-term target.  
                                                        
1  Notice that this relationship makes no judgement about whether sex workers view this profession as a 
preferred employment alternative, since sex workers are paid more than many other low level jobs and do not 
have tax obligations, or as an employer last resort (Posel, 1993).  
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This kind of behaviour can be attributed to two phenomena. First, is the empirically observed 
phenomenon that individuals tend to be hyperbolic discounters, which means that individuals 
value  preferences  differently across time, exhibiting short-run impatience and long-run 
patience (Thaler, 1985). This manifests in inconsistent choices. More specifically, workers 
may  tend to focus on a one-day time horizon rather than aiming to smooth income by 
considering future wage prospects.  Secondly, growing experimental evidence suggests that 
targeting does affect decision-making (Camerer et al, 1997). The cab drivers observed by 
Camerer et al (1997) for example, had to make the daily “rent” of the cab, and enough profit 
to be comfortable. This behaviour only applies to certain kinds of jobs, and certainly does not 
make sense for traditional formal sector occupations, with mandated hours. Instead, income 
targeting may best describe jobs where workers decide on working hours and where wages 
are uncorrelated across days. Camerer et al (2007) test this hypothesis by examining the 
behaviour of New York City cab drivers. These cab drivers are able to choose how long they 
want to work, and their wages tend to be uncorrelated across days primarily because their 
work is related to the weather. On rainy days,  fewer New Yorkers are willing to walk, 
making it easier for cab drivers to find clients.  They find a negative relationship between 
hours worked and wages (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Negative Labour Supply Curve found by Camerer et al (1997) 
 
 




Sex workers, especially street workers, are similar to cab drivers in both these respects. While 
agency based sex workers don’t face the challenges of weather, street sex workers do. Sex 
workers are also affected by exogenous demand shocks, meaning their wages tend to be 
uncorrelated across days, and they have flexibility in the hours they work, although this is 
arguably more the case for street workers than agency workers (Gould, 2008). This paper 
adopts the approach of Camerer et al (2007) and examines the labour supply of sex workers 
in Cape Town. 
 
Data 
The data used in this study was collected in 2005 by means of a short survey administered by 
outreach workers, on behalf of SWEAT, who interviewed 200 sex workers while they were 
working. Given that the sex workers interviewed had had previous contact with SWEAT, this 
suggests that the sample isn’t random. To the extent that more marginalized sex workers may 
be  under-represented in the data, this should be borne in mind in terms of the results.  
However, if it is the case that more marginalized sex workers tend to work longer hours for 
lower hourly wages/earnings, the absence of this group of workers from the data set would 
simply suggest that the results presented here could be strengthened by their inclusion. 
 
Of the 200 sex workers interviewed, two sex workers reported their race as Indian, twelve 
were males, and two were transgender. Given these very small sample sizes on these 
dimensions, these sixteen observations were dropped, reducing the sample to 184.  The 
remaining sample includes only female sex workers. Table 2 presents the summary statistics 
for the data set.  
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***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level 
 
 
The majority of the sex workers interviewed were Coloured, followed by Africans, with only 
13% of sex workers being White. All but one of the White sex workers worked indoors for 
some sort of agency, while the vast majority of African sex workers worked outdoors. By 
contrast, location of work is more evenly split amongst Coloured sex workers. Sex workers 
tend to be in their late twenties, and while outdoor workers are slightly older than indoor 
workers, these differences are not significant (Mann-Whitney z=-0.235; p=0.8146).    The 
mean experience on the job (length of time spent as a sex worker) for all sex workers is 4.18 





















(43/102)   
Age  27.08  26.59  27.55   
Experience 
(years as a 
sex worker)   4.18  3.25  5.07  ** 
No. Adults 
Supported  1.64  2.00  1.29  *** 
No. Children 
Supported  1.48  1.36  1.61   
Hours 
worked per 
Day  7.91  9.34  6.53  *** 
Average 
Daily 
Income (R)  417.53  507.87  331.08  *** 
Income per 
hour (R)  63.25  56.85  69.38   8 
 
years, with outdoor workers having spent significantly longer time in this activity than indoor 
workers (Mann-Whitney z=-2.311; p=0.0208).  
 
On average, sex workers support between 1 and 2 adults, with indoor workers reporting 
significantly higher adult dependency ratios (Mann-Whitney z=5.607; p=0.0000). According 
to SWEAT, this question was mostly interpreted as the number of adults the sex worker lived 
with, be it parents, grandparents, or a spouse. Similarly, sex workers support between 1 and 2 
children, typically biological children, but there are no significant differences between indoor 
and outdoor workers in this regard (Mann-Whitney z=-0.738; p=0.4607).  
 
On average, sex workers work 7.91 hours on a typical working day with indoor workers 
working significantly longer hours than outdoor workers (Mann-Whitney z=6.673; 
p=0.0000). This accords with previous research highlighting the fact that indoor sex workers 
are expected to work certain hours by managers, (Gould, 2008). Average daily income is the 
reported income earned by workers on an average day. The average daily income for all 
workers is R417.53, with indoor workers earning significantly higher amounts than outdoor 
workers (Mann-Whitney z=4.929; p=0.0000).  This translates into an average income per 
hour of R56.85 for indoor workers compared to R69.38 for outdoor workers.  
 
 
Results and discussion 
Following the traditional approach in economics, figures 2-7 present the labour supply curves 
for different categories of sex workers. The first diagram in each set compares hours worked 
to income per hour, while the second diagram in each set follows Camerer et al (1997) in 
taking logs of both variables in order to ensure that the results are not unduly influenced by 
some scale effect.  
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In every case, the results suggest a negative relationship between hours worked and hourly 
income earned, albeit the relationship is quite weak in the case of indoor sex workers. This 
relationship is strongest for outdoor workers as one might expect, since these workers have 
far more control over their working hours and prices charged than indoor  workers.  
Interestingly, the log diagrams for all sex workers, and for indoor sex workers in particular, 
look very similar to figure 1 presented earlier from Camerer et al’s (1997) analysis of New 
York City cab drivers.  The negative relationship between hours worked and hourly earnings 
suggested by the figures is confirmed by  the  simple ordinary least squares regressions 
presented in Table 3
2
 
. The inclusion of the quadratic term suggests that at some point, the 
relationship does become less negative, although one would hardly classify this as a turning 
point. 





worked  All  Indoor Workers  Outdoor workers 
























  0.000 
(0.000)*** 
0.000 
(0.000)***    0.000 






    2.622(0.438)***         
R-
Squared  0.177  0.208  0.343  0.063  0.128  0.241  0.332 
Sample 
Size  182  182  182  89  89  93  93 
Key: ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level ; *=significant at 10% level  
Robust Standard Errors included in brackets. 
                                                        
2 Note that the same regressions were run using a log-log specification (not reported), and the results did 
not change qualitatively. 11 
 
Table 4 presents a final set of regression estimates that show that this negative relationship is 
robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. In these regressions it is clear that both 
indoor and outdoor workers exhibit a statistically significant negative relationship between 
hours worked and income per hour. This finding is similar to Camerer et al’s (1997) finding 
that New York City cab drivers have daily income targets, and therefore quit as soon as they 
have reached the target. Workers who earn higher incomes per hour, for whatever reason, 
reach targets faster, assuming that targets aren’t determined by income per hour. This is a 
reasonable  assumption as targets are likely to be determined by exogenous personal 
circumstances and needs, and not by how much one earns in an hour, which is outside the 
workers’ control. It might be argued that income per hour isn’t outside the workers’ control if 
they can offer different services that influence the income earned in an hour. This would be 
problematic because then targets would influence both hours worked and income per hour.  
This possibility certainly exists, and in the absence of better quantitative data on the kinds of 
services offered by sex workers and prices charged, cannot be excluded. However, previous 
qualitative research by Gould (2008) suggests that sex workers operating in the Cape Town 
market  all offer most of the potential sexual services available.    This leaves price 
differentiation (by area) as a potential explanatory factor in these results, but this is controlled 
for through the inclusion of dummy variables for location of work in the regression results.  
 
The fact that indoor workers also exhibit a negative relationship between hours worked and 
income per hour is interesting.  This might suggest that agency managers  are  also daily 
income targeters. This would mean that depending on the income per hour they can achieve 
from the workers available, they let workers leave early if they are able to earn more money 
per hour. There’s no reason to think that daily income targeting would apply to sex workers 
but not their managers. When sex workers in clubs can earn more money per hour, managers 
achieve their take home daily targets faster by taking a fixed share of the hourly earnings of 
workers. This is an important addition to labour supply theory that considers employers as 
income targeters too.  12 
 
Table 4: Labour Supply Regressions with Additional Controls 
 




(0.0111)***  -0.0933 (0.0383)**  -0.0705 (0.0151)*** 
Income per 
Hour Squared  0.00008 (0.00002)***  -0.0005 (0.0002)**  0.0001 (0.00003)*** 
Agency 
(works 
indoors)  1.9082 (0.8239)**     
Black  -0.7327 (0.9041)  -1.2931 (0.9290)  -0.2325 (0.7218) 
Coloured  -7.1451 (0.9361)  -1.2184 (1.0895)   
Adults 
Supported  -0.0869 (0.1479)  -0.1477 (0.1522)  -0.1457 (0.5678) 
Children 
Suported  -0.1530 (0.1971)  -0.5588 (0.3704)  -0.1421 (0.2984) 
Adults Sup. by 
Children Sup.  0.0317 (0.0541)  0.2422 (0.1261)**  -0.0085 (0.1247) 
Experience   0.1351 (0.1294)  0.2139 (0.4277)  0.1383 (0.1510) 
Experience 
Squared  -0.0003 (0.0073)  -0.0140 (0.0408)  -0.0009 (0.0092) 
R-Squared  0.5428  0.3332  0.6518 
Sample Size  181  89  91 
Key: ***=significant at the 1% level, **=significant at the 5% level, *=significant at the 10% level, Robust 
standard errors included in brackets. Additional controls (not reported) are included for the location where the 
sex worker works. These include Bellville, Central Business District, Claremont, Goodwood, Joostenbergvlakte, 






Recent advances in behavioural economics have called into question many of the traditional 
assumptions that lie at the heart of neoclassical economics. A key finding has been the fact 
that individuals do not appear to exhibit constant discount rates over time, but rather, display 
behaviour consistent with hyperbolic discounting. This manifests in inconsistent choices. 
More specifically, workers may tend to focus on a one-day time horizon rather than aiming to 
smooth income by considering future wage prospects. Such behaviour is inconsistent with the 
traditional model of a backward bending labour supply curve. Rather, in the presence of 
income targeting, labour supply may in fact be negative. This paper finds evidence in support 
of a negative labour supply curve for sex workers in Cape Town. Of course, this behaviour 
only applies to certain kinds of jobs, and certainly does not make sense for traditional formal 
sector occupations, with mandated hours. However, it does raise interesting questions 
regarding the underlying models used to consider the labour supply decisions of workers 
engaged in occupations which allow flexibility in terms of work hours and earnings. This is a 
question that has not been given due consideration in the South African context, and suggests 
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